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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to invalidate a one-sided contract whereby the 
defendant arechitects were obligated to draw plans for a duplex sufficient 
to obtain a building permit from the authority having jurisdiction in accordance 
with requirements of local building codes, for punitive damages, for relief 
under Utah State Statute 38-1-2U of $20.00 a day for failure to release lien 
after valid tender made of payment and relief from over charging and failing 
t& prepare drawings as ordered and requested by the Court. Defendant to 
the foregoing did Counterclaim for their alleged architectural service and 
contract for "permit drawings", to foreclose a mechanic's lien therefore, 
and to obtain damages for libel. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried by the Court, setting without a jury. The Court 
entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs, for the most part, and defendants 
have appealed therefrom. 
BELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL BY RESPONDENTS 
Dismissal of Appellants Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs, the Zemps^ contacted Roger Van Frank,a licensed architect^ 
who was doing business as a professional corporation under Utah Title 16-11-
10 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended who did then enter into a 
written agreement entitled "Contract for "Permit Drawings"" wherein the 
architect defendant did "agree to furnish drawings for the project sufficient 
to obtain a Building Permit from the Authority having jurisdiction in accordance 
with requirements of local building codes", also "to charge for this service 
15$ per square foot of building area," (Exhibit 1-P; 56, 299, U26, 1*39(1)). 
The drawings were to be for a duplex similiar to two other duplexes already 
built on the property (see k) and the defendant went to the property and 
premises, inspected the existing ground level duplexes that had fire places 
on each end thereof and cement front porch steps to the front doors, (See 
Exhibit P~l5«> P-17)« Defendants prepared plans for a duplex that looked 
nothing like the existing duplexes (Exhibit P-15 and P-17),that was not a 
ground level structure, had bedrooms upstairs, no fireplaces on the ends of 
the duplex and a steel fire escape type of front stairs to the front doors, 
(See 69, 92, 3U5, 356, and 108)• 3h addition to the foregoing the plans as 
prepared by the defendants would not qualify and never did qualify sufficently 
to allow the plaintiff or the defendants to "obtain a building permit from 
the authroity having jurisdiction in accordance with requirements of local 
building codes." (See Exhibit 1-P, 56, 151, 152, 153, 223, 159, 226, 267, 155, 
268, 269,270, also Ujl, 11*2, lli3, l^U, U|£, Ufl, 27k
 9 326, 327). That upon 
-£-
receiving the defendants plans the plaintiffs were unable to use any part or 
portion thereof and did engage another licensed architect to draw plans that 
would conform to the already existing and built duplexes. (See 108, 109, 
127, 129, 130.) On the 25 day of June, 1973, the defendants did bill the 
plaintiffs for 3*67U square feet at lf?0 a square foot plan coverage area in 
the amount of $551.10. Tacked on to this bill was the sum of $60.00 explained 
solely as k hours at $15.00 each, and which the defendant at no time during 
the trial was able to explain as being justified, authorized, or agreed to 
by the defendants, also printing charges in the sum of $£.23 for a total 
charge of $6l6.33« (See Exhibit I4.-P and l£.) The defendant tried to justify 
the $60.00 as a charge for fire places, but had to admit late in the trial 
that fire places were in the already existing two duplexes and (See 2ij.,2£, 
lj.6,lj.7,M3,70.) that the plaintiffs ordered fire places right from the first 
(See 76, 86, 88.) and never ordered or agreed that such would become an 
ex±ra for a unjustified charge of $60.00. (It is interesting to note defendant 
does not ask for this in his appeal brief.) Also Mr. Mason, a licensed Architect, 
testified that a fire place is not usually charged as an extra, knows of no 
time or person that has ever charged such as an extra (See 225.) This testimony 
was never rebutted and constituteda deliberate over charge on the part of the 
defendant when he well knew that he was being paid for his plans at the rate 
of 1^0 a square foot figured on the exterior demensions of the building and 
uhat whatever 'was inside the sides of the building was paid for at "1$$ a square 
foot and not an extra, be it a fire place or a stair way. In addition to this 
from the outset of the trial the defendant admitted that he also over figured 
and over charged the square footage and amount owed. (See 38, £3, ^ . ) Also 
that if there was an extra to be charged for it would be put in writing (See 
Exhibit 1-P and 250 3h addition to this the defendant at the commencement 
of trial clamed a charge for 3,67k square feet (See 20, 21,» 35. )j and after 
ranch evasion to questions asked admitted the 3,67U square feet should be not 
more than 3,161.82 square feet^an over charge of $76.80 (See 38). On the 
2'5 day of June^ 1973, defendant was, so far as he was concerned, finished 
with his obligation to the plaintiffs, (and did bill them for a total sum of 
$616.33, which included the fireplace overcharge (for an extra not in writing) 
of $60.00 and the square footage over charge by defendants own admission 
finally of $76.80. (See Exhibit U-P and 23.) On the 23 day of August, 1973, 
defendant recorded his lien for $1,312.07, setting forth therein his claim was 
based on having completed the last work on the 20 day of July, 1973. (See 
Exhibit 5~P, 439(2).) On the 2k day of August, 1973, defendant sent a letter 
to plaintiffs (See Exhibit 6-Pf)f On the 27 day of September, 1973, defendants 
counsel sent plaintiffs counsel a letter demanding payment of $837.57 and 
therein said letter recited footage charge of 3,674 square feet at 15$ a foot 
(See Exhibit 7-P). 
On the 2 day of October, 1973, plaintiffs counsel sent to defendants 
counsel a letter (See Exhibit 9-P) wherein Notice was given to the defendant 
that the plans and specifications were not as contracted for and wholely 
unsatisfactory, that plaintiff should not have to pay for time taken by the 
owner to correct and direct the architect to acconplish that which he should 
do in the first place (stairs-fireplaces etc. changes), and with this letter 
a certified check of $626.57, was tendered which was substantially more than 
the amount of $474.30 that the defendant could have charged. (See Exhibit 
4-P and 38 ie 3,674 square feet at l$f a square foot = $551.10 less admitted 
over charge of $76.80 = $474.30.) 
3 I 
On the 5 day of October, 1973, defendants counsel responded to the 
$626.57 tender with a return thereof and a demand for payment of $837»57j 
also the same day the defendant did, days after the right to file and record a lien 
had expired, dii file a second lien called an "Amended Notice of Lien" claim 
payment of $6l6.33. (See Exhibit 10-P and Itfil). This lien for $616.13 was 
filed and recorded after the plaintiff had already tendered the sum of $626.57 
to the defendants and was recorded some 101 days after the defendant had billed 
the plaintiff for the job (See Exhibit ij.-P) and had finished his job including 
charging $60.00 for not in writing extras (See 23) primarily the fireplaces. At 
no time and not until after the trial did the defendant release either lien 
so there was of record two (2) liens (One for $1,312.07, and one for $6l6.33) 
placed by the defendant on the property, although admitting the $1,312.07 
first lien was improperly made (See 320). 
On the 27 day of November, 1973* plaintiffs commenced the above 
entitled action against the defendant and did therein (See i;38 also 321, 322 
and 323) did set forth, allege and put the defendant on "Notice" that he had 
over charged on the square foot building area covered. The same information 
and "Notice" of over charging was given to the defendant in answer to Interrogatories 
submitted to plaintiff on the Ik day of May, 197k, (See l£3) and answer thereto 
made on the 7 day of June, 197^ (See lj.09) also for defendants regard therefore 
(See 322.). 
On the 19 day of December, 1973, the defendant answered plaintiff's 
Complaint and admitted that his first lien claim for money was more than twice 
as much as the amount of his original bill, also that he had not over charged 
as to the square footage of the building as plaintiff alleged in the Complaint. 
(See ii.20 and 1*21.) On the Ik day of March, 197k, demand was made upon defendant 
- V - S -
to mitigate damages by setting forth by record the correct figure that could 
be claimed (See Exhibit 12-P and I4I8.). Needless to say the defendant declined 
to figure the correct footage, the correct amount claimed or to release from 
the record the first lien claiming $1,312.07 as owuig. On the Ik day of May, 
197k, the defendant served written Interrogatories upon plaintiffs and requested 
of the plaintiffs what they believed the proper charge for the square foot 
building area covered was, the total dollars therefore, the cents per square 
foot, what the overcharge was and what the correct total of square footage 
was (See lj.13, 321, 322 and 323). On the 7 day of June, 197k, the plaintiffs 
answered the defendants interrogatories setting forth what they believed the 
square footage to be and the amount overcharged, giving and putting the defendant 
on further "Notice" that his amounts set forth in both liens were wrong. 
(See kP9, 321, 322 and 323). 
On the 20 day of August, 197k, trial was commenced during which 
the defendant under oath tried to justify a $60.00 over charge for fire 
places as an extra because it hadnrt been discussed originally (See 27, I4.7) 
and then thereafter later in the trial after his own initial preliminary plans 
disclosed a fireplace thereon reversed his testimony (See 76, 109 and 312), 
and also after a great deal of non-responsive answers to figuring the square 
coverage giving him the benefit of every possibility on the area houndries 
did he admit that he had over figured and over charged the plaintiffs, (See 
38, 53, and 7k) the sum of $76.80. On the 23 day of August, 197k, the trial 
was concluded and thereafter in accordance with defendants testimony and admissions 
as well as Utah Law Title 16-11-10 the defendant Roger Van Frank was made 
liable. (See 2, Exhibit 1-P, 18, 327, 333, 335, 336, 337, 338.) 
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS ARGUMENTS 
Defendant ask equity to relieve them of the Utah State Statute 38-
l~2l|« To receive equity you must give equity. In this case a man with a 
10th grade education (See 101), with a alcoholic problem back ground, with 
his wife comes to a highly trained professional, well versed in figures and 
trained sufficiently to be licensed as an Architect individual, who prepares 
a highly one sided contract that provides that he be paid for services rendered,-
that the plans and drawing remain his property; that he need provide only 
"drawings for the project sufficient to obtain a building permit"j payment 
of money upon receipt of delivery of plans (without regard of whether the 
owner is satisfied therewith)and ,"a finance charge computed by a periodic 
rate" of $$> per month," (See 3i;0 wherein defendant conceded 6% per year as 
the interest rate) together with terminal and deliquency charges including 
attorneys fees* (See Exhibit 1-P.) l/\ho admitted in Court that he was advised 
at all times by counsel and had full knowledge of what he did# ItfLth this 
superior knowledge the defendant prepares for the signature of the defendants 
this self serving agreement that entitled him to payment for a set of plans 
regardless of ifcat they might look like or how adequate they may be, so long 
only that they be sufficient to obtain and pass the Hiilding code. With this 
only obligation on his part, armed with his selfserving contract and superior 
knowledge he files a $1,312,07 lien on plaintiffs realty. An amount nearly 
three (3) times the amount of $ltfU.27 he finally conceded he could possibly 
be entitled to claims by his own figuring (See 38) and allowing him every 
possible coverage of the area. He justifies this on the basis that he is 
entitled to attorneys fees in a sum of nearly twice the amount that could be 
owing to him for the square footage the plans covered. This at a time when 
he had actually incurred no attorney fees, had prepared plans that would not be 
sufficient to obtain a "Building Permit11 and afriich in no way matched, looked 
like or had a relation appearance to the already then existing duplexes on 
- 7~ 
the property• The contract i s one-sided, even so the defendant did not perform 
the same, he breached the contract f i r s t and then without mercy, without 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n , without attempting t o sa t is fy or work out anything to give 
the p l a i n t i f f what they sought, did l i e n the property and demand payment of 
$1,312.07. 
The defendant refuses to change the fireplaces from where he wanted 
them after the plaintiffs insisted on the same, insists on a dormer porch 
and iron escape front steps. Plaintiffs get nothing of what they want and 
in desperation have to go to another architect to receive the same. Ttfhen 
the plaintiffs challenge payment the defendant demands and the plaintiffs 
are told for the first time they are to pay $60.00 for k hours at $l£.00 
each (See Exhibit 1*~P) as an estra which the defendant tried to claiin for 
fireplaces that he first testified was not discussed at first and "then when 
unable to continue supporting (because his own preliminary drawing showed 
otherwise) he did a 180 degree turn. Why this apparent over charge? If 
the fireplaces were to be an extra why didn*t he corrply with his own prepared 
contract (See Exhibit 1-P)wi»&£b provides in the last line thereof "modification 
or assignments, of this Agreement will be in writing only, signed and dated 
by both parties." 
Although the trial Court did find for the most part for the plaintiff 
the filing of the second lien for $6l6.33 on the $ day of October, 1973, is 
of some note if tinder the Utah Supreme Court Case of Roberts Investment Company 
v. Gibbons and Reed (See 22 Utah 2d 10£) the first lien filed the 23 day of 
August, 1973, was held invalid. Both liens recite the last work as being 
on the 20 day of July, 1973. Testimony of defendant Van Frank (See 13, U±, 
23) also defendants witness Dennis Cecchini (See I87, 193) also defendant 
witness Brigitta Gorhik (See 200, 201) also defendant witness Carol Merritt 
(See 252, 253, 260, 261, 262, 263), and finally a final bill (See Exhibit lt-P) 
dated the 2£ day of June, 1973, establishes without question the last work for 
which the defendant could lien the plaintiffs property was the 26 day of June, 
1973, and not the 20 day of July, 1973. Plaintiff Mr, Zemp, agrees that it 
was on that date he picked up the plans after waiting for them and receiving 
them still ,rwetK from the printers (See lOlj. and 335)* There is nothing in 
the trial record that supports any contracted for architectural work on behalf 
of the defendant after the 26 day of June, 1973, when the plaintiffs were 
billed $616.33 dated the 25 day of June, 1973. There is h days in June (I*), 
there is 31 days in July (31), there is 31 days in August (31), there is 30 
days in September (30), and 5 days in October (5), had elapsed when the defendant 
filed his second "amended" lien. A total of 101 days, nofe timely filed and 
should be disregarded and of no effect as not timely filed, except to add 
another recorded lien against the plaintiffs property. 
Except for defendants appeal to equity to relieve him of the lawful 
consequences of his acts it is clear that he was the Captain of his own ship 
and advised at all times by counsel* That the trial Judges comments (See 
3I4I to 3I1.7) apply and nothing the undersigned could add, could replace the 
reasons of the trial Court herein concerning the actions or lack of action 
of the defendant which make him by law liable, 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah State Statute 38-l-2lj. is clear and in this case the evidence 
is clear that there was a proper tender by the plaintiffs and the defendant 
failed to remove the liens. If the law is valiccl it should apply in this 
case, as I can think of no case more justified for its application than under 
the evidence, and facts set forth in black and white of the transcript of 
this case. The defendant was by any and all standards wrong and wrong again. 
-f-
and if the Utah State Statute 38-1-21+ is to be a valid and effective statute, 
it should apply in this case and the undersigned does disagree with defendants 
counsel and last line of his brief "that there is no lawful basis to sustain 
the decree that they pay respondents a statutory penalty of $203QC per day 
for noncancellation of the mechanic's lien," or that the plaintiff should 
have to pay to the defendant the suin of $5>39o£3j together with interest, 
costs of Court and an attorney fee. 
Respectfully submitted, this •A y of October, 1975. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Respondents* 
-to-
